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ABSTRACT

The effects that are predicted to occur as a result of global climate change have
the potential to be devastating, effecting food and water security, threatening sensitive
ecosystems and species, and forcing the relocation of thousands of people. However,
little has been done to effectively combat this problem for two primary reasons: there are
uncertainties surrounding climate change projections and many countries are unwilling to
accept their fair share of the burden. This project will attempt to reframe these problems.
Specifically, I will argue that it is rational for policymakers to act on the model-generated
predictions of climate change, and (based on the framework that Rawls lays out in The
Law of Peoples), all peoples have a duty to work towards the abatement of and adaptation
to climate change.
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Introduction
Since the late 1980s, the problem of global climate change has been center stage
in the international policy arena. The effects that are predicted to occur as a result of
global climate change have the potential to be devastating, effecting food and water
security, threatening sensitive ecosystems and species, and forcing the relocation of
thousands of people.1 However, as of yet, little has been done that has both effectively
incorporated all major global players while at the same time promoting the type of action
that is necessary to combat this problem. The primary reasons underlying this lack of
commitment have to do with the uncertainties surrounding climate change projections
and the unwillingness of some countries to accept their fair share of the burden.
Specifically, many policymakers have claimed that any action taken towards abatement
would be irrational, since there is not yet one-hundred percent certainty surrounding the
forecasts. Additionally, some world leaders have argued that they will not commit
themselves to any treaty that places “too much” of a burden on their country, regardless
of what is fair. This project will attempt to offer a new way of looking at these problems.
Specifically, I will argue that it is rational for policymakers to act on the model-generated
predictions of climate change, and (based on the framework that Rawls lays out in The
Law of Peoples), all peoples have a duty to work towards the abatement of and adaptation
to climate change (as a matter of international morality). I develop this latter claim by
drawing on Rawls’s Law of Peoples.

1

Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change,
Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001), Summary for Policymakers.
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Chapter I lays out the necessary background information surrounding climate
change. Specifically, I address the human contribution to climate change as well as the
uncertainties intrinsic to climate science and climate change predictions. Continuing,
chapter II deals with the issue of uncertainty surrounding climate change predictions.
Coupling van Fraassen’s concept of empirical adequacy with Douglas’s conception of
inductive risk, I argue for the rationality of acting on model-generated predictions. Since
it is rational to act on the model-generated predictions, Chapter III explores the demands
of international morality to the problem of climate change. Specifically, I argue that the
framework that Rawls details in The Law of Peoples provides a viable option for dealing
with this problem. From this framework, it can be shown that all peoples have a duty to
work towards the abatement of climate change as well as to aid in the adaptation of other
peoples to the effects of climate change as an extension of their duty to assist.

2

Chapter I – Climate Change and Climate Science

Introduction
This chapter seeks to give a brief layout of the scientific ground that currently
surrounds the climate change debate. Section I gives a quick overview of the importance
and functioning of the Earth’s atmosphere. Section II outlines the contribution that
anthropogenic activities have on global climate change. Continuing, section III details
sources of uncertainty in climate science and prediction. Finally, section V illuminates
the impacts that climate change is predicted to have and the degrees of certainty
associated with the predicted impacts, as detailed by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC).

Section I - How the Atmosphere Works
The Earth’s atmosphere serves three vital functions. First, it provides those gases
that are essential to the life-sustaining process on Earth. Specifically, it provides carbon
dioxide for photosynthesis, oxygen for respiration, and nitrogen for nitrogen-fixing
bacteria and plants. Second, the atmosphere also serves a very important protective
function - it absorbs life threatening solar radiation, preventing it from reaching the
surface of the Earth. Finally, the atmosphere stabilizes the Earth’s temperature by a
process known as the greenhouse effect. If the greenhouse effect did not occur, then the
average surface temperature of the Earth would be around –18oC.2 In this process, water
vapor and carbon dioxide reabsorb outgoing radiation from the surface and reradiate

2

Stanley E. Manahan, Environmental Chemistry, 6th ed. (Boca Raton, Fl.: Lewis Publishers, 1994), 270.
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about half of that energy back to the surface, creating a relatively stable temperature of
15oC. 3 The water molecules in the atmosphere are primarily responsible for most of the
absorption of infrared radiation. Carbon dioxide, although present in a much lesser
concentration, also aids in the reabsorption of infrared radiation. This absorption is key in
maintaining the Earth’s heat balance. An increase in the concentration of any greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere may lessen heat loss, thereby increasing Earth’s temperature.

Section II - The Anthropogenic Contribution to Climate Change
In 1988, the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations
Environment Programme jointly established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC). This organization was founded with the purposes of assessing “available
scientific and socioeconomic information on climate change and its impacts on the
options for mitigating climate change and adapting to it” and “too provide, on request,
scientific/technical/socioeconomic advice to the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).”4 Recently, the
IPCC completed their Third Assessment Report (TAR). Much of this report deals with
determining the degree that anthropogenic activities have contributed to climate change.
Indeed, atmospheric variability and climate change occur naturally, oscillating to
maintain the natural, delicate balance that exists between all the elements of the climate
system. However, since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, man has influenced
this balance by changing the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the Earth’s

3
4

Manahan, 270.
Working Group II, forward.
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atmosphere, primarily through the burning of fossil fuels (aerosols, biomass burning,
land-use change, and deforestation have all contributed, as well).5 Science has confirmed
that the levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere remained constant for about one
thousand years before the Industrial Revolution.6 Since then, the concentrations of
several greenhouse gases have increased in the atmosphere, most notably the
concentration of carbon dioxide. There has been a thirty percent increase in the carbon
dioxide level since pre-industrial times, and this concentration is continuing to increase at
a rate of .4 percent per year.7 With regards to this observed change, the IPCC writes,
“We know that this increase is anthropogenic because the changing isotopic composition
of the atmospheric CO2 [carbon dioxide] betrays the fossil origin of the increase.”8 An
increase in carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere leads to a
greater amount of radiation that is trapped between the atmosphere and the surface of the
Earth, thereby increasing the temperature of the Earth’s surface. In other words,

5

Human induced land-use changes have also been shown to significantly contribute to climate change.
The term “land-use change” refers to “any change in use or management of the land”. (Working Group I to
the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2001:
The Scientific Basis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 93.) Changes in the land due to
agriculture, irrigation, deforestation, reforestation, aforestation, urbanization, and traffic are some of the
more severe ways in which anthropogenic activities have altered the land. (Working Group I, 93) The TAR
reports that “land-use change results in changing the physical and biological properties of the land surface
and thus the climate system.” (Working Group I, 93.) There are two specific ways in which land-use
changes can affect the global climate system. First, land-use change can influence the land-atmosphere
exchanges of radiation, heat, and water. Second, land-use changes can result in the destruction or alteration
of vegetation, thus altering terrestrial carbon sinks. (Working Group I, 443) This problem can be
intensified, as changes in climate can directly affect land-use. As the concentration of carbon dioxide
increases in the atmosphere, and the surface temperature of the Earth increases, there will be substantial
changes in the ways that certain land areas can be used. For example, agriculture in some regions will
change. In some areas it is likely that crop yields and crop types will be altered. Changes in water
availability due to climate change will also influence agricultural practices.
6
Working Group I, 92.
7
Working Group I, 92.
8
Working Group I, 92.
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anthropogenic activities are contributing to higher concentrations of carbon dioxide (and
other greenhouse gases) in the atmosphere, thus creating an enhanced greenhouse effect.
The TAR reports that “the warming over the last 50 years due to anthropogenic
greenhouse gases can be identified despite uncertainties due to anthropogenic sulfate
aerosol and natural factors (volcanoes and solar irradiance).”9 Further, “human
influences will continue to change atmospheric composition throughout the 21st century”
and “anthropogenic climate change will persist for many centuries.”10 Anthropogenic
influences on climate change can be identified apart from natural influences in order to
determine the affect that human activities have on the climate system. These claims are
founded on a multitude of detection and attribution studies.11 Through these types of
studies, new evidence has surfaced that shows that anthropogenic activity has influenced
the observed trend of global warming, and will continue to influence climate change,
primarily through the use of fossil fuels and the consequent release of carbon dioxide into
the atmosphere. By analyzing new reconstructions of temperature over the last 1,000

9

Working Group I, 10.
Working Group I, 12, 17.
11
Detection is “the process of demonstrating that an observed change is significantly different (in a
statistical sense) than can be explained by natural variability.” (Working Group I, 55) Attribution is “the
processes of establishing cause and effect with some defined level of confidence, including the assessment
of competing hypotheses.” (Working Group I, 55) Through detection studies, scientists are able to
determine whether or not an observed change is statistically unusually. However, these studies cannot
pinpoint the cause of the change. Attribution studies in climate change employ statistical analysis and
careful examination of evidence to show (within a pre-specified margin of error) that the changes in
question are:
1.) unlikely to be due entirely to internal variability;
2.) consistent with the estimate responses to the given combination of anthropogenic and natural
forcing; and
3.) not consistent with alternative, physically plausible explanations of recent climate change that
exclude important elements of the given combination of forcings. (Working Group I, 55-56.
Natural external forcings include, but are not limited to, radiation from the sun or volcanic
activity. Anthropogenic external forcing of the climate system includes, but is not limited to,
burning fossil fuels and deforestation.)
10
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years, it was found that the observed temperature changes in the last 100 years are
“unlikely to be entirely natural in origin, even taking into account the large uncertainties
(in palaeo-reconstructions).”12 The authors of the TAR write, “even if the models
underestimate the magnitude of the response to solar or volcanic forcing, the spatial and
temporal patterns are such that these effects alone cannot explain the observed
temperature changes over the 20th century.”13 Furthermore, these studies have found that
a “significant anthropogenic contribution” is needed to account for the changes in surface
and tropospheric temperature trends over “at least the last thirty years” and “while
detection in anthropogenic factors is often ambiguous, detection of the influences of
greenhouse gases on the surface temperature changes over the past 50 years is robust.”14
To add to the scope of new evidence that shows that human activities are
contributing to climate change, there is now a broad range of reliable detection
techniques from which to gather and assess data. The TAR reports that “the increase in
the number of studies, breadth of techniques, increased rigor in the assessment of the role
of anthropogenic forcing in climate, and the robustness of results to the assumptions
made using those techniques, has increased the confidence in these aspects of detection
and attribution.”15 Perhaps most importantly, the TAR reports that despite uncertainties,
there is no question that human activities have contributed to global warming. The

12

Working Group I, 56.
Working Group I, 57.
14
Working Group I, 57.
15
Working Group I, 57.
13
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authors write, “uncertainties in other forcings that have been included do not prevent
identification of the effect of anthropogenic greenhouse gases over the last 50 years.”16

Section III - Sources of Uncertainty
The authors of the TAR acknowledge and assess the uncertainties that are
inherent in climate science. In this report, the authors address the uncertainties of climate
science and the impacts that they have on the likelihood of their future projections. The
TAR cites three main categories of sources of uncertainties: problems with data,
problems with models, and other sources of uncertainties.17 Problems with data include,
but are not limited to:
1.) Missing components or errors in the data
2.) “Noise” in data associated with biased or incomplete observations
3.) Random sampling error and biases (nonrepresentativeness) in a
sample.18
Problems with models include, but are not limited to:
1.) Known processes but unknown functional relationships or errors in
structure of model
2.) Known structure but unknown or erroneous values of some important
parameters
3.) Known historical data and model structure but reasons to believe
parameters or model structure will change over time
4.) Uncertainty regarding predictability (e.g., chaotic or stochastic
behavior) of system or effect
5.) Uncertainties introduced by approximation techniques used to solve a
set of equations that characterize the model.19
Finally, other sources of uncertainty include, but are not limited to:
1.) Ambiguously defined concepts and terminology
16

Working Group I, 59.
Working Group II, 127.
18
Working Group II, 127.
19
Working Group II, 127.
17
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2.) Inappropriate spatial/temporal units
3.) Inappropriateness of/lack of confidence in underlying assumptions
4.) Uncertainty resulting from projections of human behavior (e.g., future
consumption patterns or technological change), as distinct from
uncertainty resulting from “natural” sources (e.g., climate sensitivity,
chaos).20
The projections of the impacts of future climate change made by the IPCC are made with
these uncertainties in mind. Additionally, each projection is categorized by its degree of
uncertainty.

Section IV - Impacts of Climate Change and Degrees of Certainty
Given the uncertainties in both the science of climate change and in the
projections that climate scientists make, the authors of the TAR attempt to employ a
“unified approach for assessing, characterizing, and reporting uncertainties in the
TAR.”21 The importance of recognizing and characterizing uncertainty is expressed by
Moss and Schneider. They write;
One of the major challenges in preparing the IPCC Third Assessment
Report (TAR) is that authors will need to present a clear snapshot of
information on climate change, potential impacts, and response options,
when the extent of that we know is continuously evolving. Given the
needs of decision-makers to weigh potential responses to the risks of
climate change before all uncertainties can be resolves, the available
information, imperfect as it may be, must be synthesized, evaluated, and
presented in a responsible and informative manner. To do this, lead
authors will be reviewing the published literature, documenting the ranges
and distributions of findings and estimates in the literature, assessing the
scientific merit of this information, and explicitly distinguishing and
communicating which findings are well understood, which are somewhat
understood, and which are speculative. In short, assessment of the relative
credibility of a variety of processes and outcomes is a major goal of the
Reports.22
20

Working Group II, 127.
Working Group II, 80.
22
R. Moss and S. Schneider, “Uncertainties in the IPCC TAR: recommendations to lead authors for more
consistent assessment and reporting,” in Guidance Papers on the Cross Cutting Issues of the Third
21
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In an effort to promote consistency, confidence schemes and qualitative terms were
developed and utilized to assess and communicate the scientific merit of the information
presented.
The degrees of uncertainty presented in Working Group II are based on a
Bayesian probability framework. Within this framework, “the probability of an event is
the degree of belief that exists among lead authors and reviewers that the event will
occur, given observations, modeling results, and theory currently available.”23
Expressed on a quantitative scale, there are five levels within this scheme that are used to
categorize degrees of uncertainty; these levels are very high confidence level, high
confidence level, medium confidence level, low confidence level, and very low
confidence level.24 Additionally, there is an optional second scale that could be used to
supplement the quantitative scale if the authors deemed necessary; this second method
employed is Bayseian as well, but is qualitative, rather than quantitative. It exists as a
supplement, and not an alternative, because the terms do not map well onto a quantitative
scale, thus increasing the possibility for inconsistent usage; it was used only in those
instances when a writing team felt the need to explain why it assigned the confidence

Assessment Report of the IPCC, ed. R. Pachauri, T. Taniguchi, and K. Tanaka (Geneva: World
Meteorological Association, 2000), 34.
23
Working Group II, 79.
24
Working Group II, 79.
5-Point Qualitative Scale for Confidence Levels
1. 95% or greater is a very high confidence level
2. 67-95% is a high confidence level
3. 33-67% is a medium confidence level
4. 5-33% is a low confidence level
5. 5% or less is a very low confidence level
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level that it did.25

It assesses and reports on the “quality or level of scientific

understanding that supports a given conclusion” based on evidence and agreement among
experts.26 Within this method, there are four “state of knowledge” descriptors; these
descriptors are well-established knowledge, established but incomplete knowledge,
competing explanations, and speculative knowledge.27 While the five point scale was
recommended for all working groups to the third assessment report, working Group I
adopted a separate, seven point scale (also Bayseian) to express judgmental degrees of
confidence. This was done primarily because authors in Working Group I disagreed with
the recommended wording; “Decisions to adopt a 7-level scale for describing likelihood
were taken primarily to introduce a descriptor for a very high level of likelihood
expressing results from observational studies involving large amounts of information.”28

25

Moss and Schneider, 44.
Working Group II, 79.
27
Working Group II, 79.
Qualitative State of Knowledge Descriptors
1. Well- Established – Models incorporate known processes; observations are consistent with
models; or multiple lines of evidence support the finding.
2. Established but Incomplete – Models incorporate most known processes, although some
parameterizations may not be well tested; observations are somewhat consistent but incomplete;
current empirical estimates are well founded, but the possibility of changes in governing processes
over time is considerable; or only one or a few lines of evidence supports the finding.
3. Competing Explanations – Different model representations account for different aspects of
observations or evidence or incorporate different aspects of key processes, leading to competing
explanations.
4. Speculative – Conceptually plausible ideas that haven’t received much attention in the literature
or that are laced with difficult to reduce uncertainties.
28
Martin Manning, et al, ed., IPCC Workshop on Describing Scientific Uncertainties in Climate Change to
Support Analysis of Risk and of Options: Workshop Report (Boulder, CO.: IPCC Working Group I
Technical Support Unit, 2004), 33.
26
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They use the following terms: virtually certain, very likely, likely, medium likelihood,
very unlikely, and exceptionally unlikely.29
Despite the implicit uncertainties present in predictions involving the impacts of
future climate change, there are several predictions that are made with force in the TAR.
In general, climate sensitivity is likely to range between 1.5-4.5oC between the years
1990 and 2100.30 These numbers are based on the atmospheric-ocean general circulation
model (AOGCM), which uses a range of possible emissions scenarios as developed in the
IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES).31 The TAR also states that all land
areas will warm more rapidly than the global average, as the global average takes into
account the warming of the oceans which warm slower than land masses.32 For instance,
AOGCM scenarios project that winter warming for all high-latitude northern regions will
exceed the global mean warming by more than 40%.33 Glaciers and ice caps are
predicted to retreat, while Northern Hemisphere snow cover and sea ice are projected to
decrease, as well. Global average sea level increases are expected to fall between .11 and

29

Working Group I, 28.
1. virtually certain – greater than 99% that a result is true
2. very likely – 90-99% chance
3. likely – 69-90% chance
4. medium likelihood – 33-66% chance
5. unlikely – 10-33% chance
6. very unlikely – 1-10% chance
7. exceptionally unlikely – less than 1% chance
30
Working Group I, 67. Climate sensitivity is defined as “the equilibrium response of global surface
temperature to a doubling of equivalent CO2 concentration.”
31
For more information on the IPCC SRES, see Working Group I to the Third Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change, Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 62-63.
32
Working Group I, 67.
33
Working Group I, 67.
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.77 meters. 34 Additionally, carbon dioxide concentrations are predicted to reach 540-970
ppm by 2100.35
Further, the TAR projects even more specific impacts with high confidence
levels. In Africa, it is predicted that gain yields will decease, affecting overall food
security. There is expected to be an increase in droughts, floods, and other extreme
weather events which will undoubtedly put stress on food and water resources, hinder
development, and adversely affect human health. Additionally, scientists predict that
coastal settlements in Africa will suffer in various ways (higher instances of erosion,
displacement of people, etc) because of the predicted rise in sea-level.36
Asia is forecasted to experience an increase in floods, droughts, forest fires, and
tropical cyclones, especially in the temperate and tropical regions of the continent. These
extreme weather events, specifically tropical cyclones and flooding, are expected to
displace tens of millions of people in the low lying coastal areas of temperate and tropical
Asia. Due to the predicted rise in sea level, the ecological security of delicate
ecosystems, primarily mangroves and coral reefs, will be put at risk.37
In Australia and New Zealand, water security will be jeopardized because of the
drying trends that are expected to envelop the region. Further, animal and plant species

34

Working Group I, 75. The TAR cites the following contributions to the rise in sea level:
1. a thermal expansion of .11 - .43 m
2. a glacier contribution of .01-.23m
3. a Greenland contribution of -.02 - .09m
4. an Antarctic contribution of -.17 - .02m
35
Working Group I, 63. Uncertainties in this projection cause a variation of -10 - +30%. Given this
variation, the total range of carbon dioxide concentration in 2100 is 490 – 1260 ppm. (Working Group I,
63.)
36
Working Group II, 14.
37
Working Group II, 14.
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with very specific climate niches are expected to become endangered or extinct due to the
fragile ecosystems in this region that will be negatively affected by climate change.38
In Europe, decrease in summer runoff, water availability, and soil moisture will
heavily impact the drought prone southern regions. In coastal areas, the risks of flooding,
erosion, and wetland loss are anticipated to increase, consequently affecting human
settlement, industry, tourism, agriculture, and coastal habitats. Moreover, biotic zones
are projected to make a northward shift, resulting in the loss of important natural habitats,
thereby threatening the livelihood of some species.39
In Latin America, water supplies will be compromised due to the loss and retreat
of glaciers. Droughts and floods are expected to become more frequent, with floods
increasing sediment deposit, consequently tainting water supplies in some areas.
Decreases in the yields of important crops are predicted and subsistence farming in some
regions of Latin America will be threatened. In addition, the rate of biodiversity loss is
expected to increase for this area.40
Areas of North America are expected to experience enhanced coastal erosion,
coastal flooding, loss of coastal wetlands, and an increased risk of storm surges,
particularly in Florida and large portions of the U.S. Atlantic coastline. Furthermore, the
TAR reports that “Climate change in the polar regions is expected to be among the
largest and most rapid of any region on Earth, and will cause major physical, ecological,

38

Working Group II, 15.
Working Group II, 15.
40
Working Group II, 15.
39
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sociological, and economic impacts, especially in the Arctic, Antarctic Peninsula, and
Southern Ocean.”41
Finally, small island states will also suffer many severe effects of climate change.
The anticipated rise in sea-level will be especially detrimental to these areas. The
increase in sea-level is expected to cause enhanced coastal erosion, an increased loss of
land and property, an increased risk of storm surges, dislocation of people, and an
increased risk of the loss of coastal ecosystems, and pose a threat to freshwater reserves
due to the infiltration of sea water. The agricultural and tourism industries will also
suffer loses due to the rise in sea-level.42 Moreover, for all the regions described there are
additional impacts that are predicted with medium confidence.43

Conclusion
The atmosphere is vital to life (human and nonhuman) on Earth. However, with
the onset of the Industrial Revolution, mankind has started to alter one of the fundamental
functions that the atmosphere provides; specifically, anthropogenic activities have begun
to intensify the greenhouse effect, consequently resulting in an overall warming of the
globe. While there are uncertainties associated with climate science and the impacts that
climate change will have, many predictions can be made with a very high or high degree
of certainty. In sum, anthropogenic induced climate change will have an effect on all life
forms on the planet, including humans.

41

Working Group II, 16.
Working Group II, 17.
43
These impacts are detailed in Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel of Climate Change, Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), table SPM-2, 15-17.
42
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Chapter II - Empirical Adequacy, Inductive Risk, and Model-Generated Climate
Predictions

Introduction
In this chapter, I argue that the predictions generated by climate models offer a
foundation from which to act (to develop policy), even though there are uncertainties
associated with them. This claim will incorporate both van Fraassen’s idea of empirical
adequacy and Douglas’s extended conception of inductive risk.
In section I, I give a brief explanation of van Fraassen’s account of empirical
adequacy. In section II, I offer a general description of general circulation models and
the problems that are associated with their use. In section III, I argue that the theories on
which the general circulation models are based are empirically adequate based on their
ability to accurately account for past and present climate events. Continuing, in section
IV, I argue that Douglas’s conception of inductive risk offers a framework within which
to consider these predictions. However, in order to correctly calculate the inductive risk,
the risk of wrongfully accepting the predictions needs to be considered. Thus, I consider
some of the relevant non-epistemic values as well as assess the empirical adequacy of
economic models. Finally, I conclude that by coupling the idea of empirical adequacy
with the idea of inductive risk, it is rational to act on model-generated climate
predictions.44

44

The term “rational” used in this chapter is simply meant to refer to an action that is based on reason. The
use of the term “rational” in this chapter differs from the use in Chapter III, as Rawls gives a very specific
definition for what is meant by rational.
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Section I - A Brief Explanation of van Fraassen’s Concept of Empirical Adequacy
In his work, The Scientific Image, Bas van Fraassen writes that “Science aims to
give us theories which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves a
belief only that it is empirically adequate.”45 A theory is empirically adequate if what it
says about observable things is true, and “…such a theory has at least one model that all
the actual phenomena fit inside.”46 Thus, for van Fraassen, what is counted as an
observable entity is of extreme importance. He holds that what is observable is both
theory-independent and a function of the facts about humans qua organisms in the world.
Additionally, he explains that “…what counts as an observable phenomenon is a function
of what the epistemic community is (i.e. observable is observable to us).”47 Elaborating
on this idea, he explains that science designates what is properly considered observable
and that the limits of observation cannot be described with finality. Therefore, for a
scientist to accept a theory means that he holds that the theory is accurate with regards to
its account of the observable.48
Continuing, van Fraassen explains that
To present a theory is to specify a family of structures, its models; and
secondly, to specify certain parts of these models (the empirical
substructures) as candidates for the direct representation of observable
phenomena. The structures which can be described in experimental and
measurement reports we can call appearances: the theory is empirically
adequate if it has some model such that all appearances are isomorphic to
empirical substructures of that model.49

45

Bas van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 12.
van Fraassen, 12.
47
van Fraassen, 19.
48
van Fraassen, 57-9.
49
van Fraassen, 64.
46
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Complete empirical adequacy seems to be an ideal for van Fraassen. He writes,
“…empirical adequacy goes far beyond what we can know at any given time. (All the
results of measurement are not in; and in any case, we won’t measure everything that can
be measured.)” 50 This suggests that there can be degrees of empirical adequacy, all of
which aim towards complete empirical adequacy. Therefore, for van Fraassen, it seems
as if in a theory’s “lifetime” it can become more or less empirically adequate depending
the tools available for measurement and observation; however once measurement or
observation has been made, then the theory must agree. To the degree that the theory
agrees it is empirically adequate.

Section II - General Circulation Models
The most common types of models used in climate science are general circulation
models (GCMs). In general, GCMs are mathematical simulations of climate based on
physical principles of long-term atmospheric conditions.51 These basic and wellunderstood principles provide the foundation of all climate models and include things
such as theories of the behavior of gases, the radiation absorption and emission
characteristics of different gases, and turbulent fluid gas flows (defined primarily within
the field of thermodynamics and other branches of physics).52 These models are used for
two primary purposes: for predicting future climates, and accounting for causes of change
in the past. They incorporate a wide range of complex processes that are attributed to
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climate change. (These processes include, but are not limited to large scale oceanic
processes and atmospheric processes and most aspects of terrestrial energy, water, and
carbon cycles.53)

However, they are currently incapable of simulating some climate

process directly (often, these processes are not completely understood, and their
relationship to other known processes are assumed). For example, currently, the role of
clouds, some stratospheric processes, the role of humidity/water vapor, and soil moisture
processes are not accurately represented in models.54

Processes that cannot be

simulated directly are known as sub grid scale processes. GCMs start with a few
empirically derived inputs, such as solar radiation, gas composition of the atmosphere,
sea surface temperature, and orbital precession.55 The models are then run and the
simulated climate is compared to long term observed climate trends.
Consequently, several problems arise with the use of climate models. First, due to
the fact that all the processes still can’t be simulated directly, there are uncertainties with
regard to how accurate the simulated climates will be. Additionally, many of the
predictions that are generated by the models are for hundreds to thousands of years in the
future. Therefore, there are obvious difficulties confirming the model outputs.
In order to counter these uncertainties, techniques have been developed to
improve the models. One such technique is parameterization. Parameterization seeks to
represent sub-grid-scale processes in terms of large scale variables. Thus, a large part of
the modeler’s job is determining this relationship; Edwards writes,
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For example, rather than represent cloud formation in terms of convection
columns, cloud condensation nuclei, and other direct causes, a GCM
typically calculates the amount of cloud cover within a grid box as some
function of temperature and humidity.56
If the relationship cannot be determined, modelers are forced to use ad hoc schemes that
provide the models with the necessary connection.57 Thus, there is a question of how (if
at all) parameterization affects the overall model results. Additionally, scientists are
often forced to tune the parameters. Tuning the parameters involves “adjusting the values
and coefficients and even, sometimes, reconstructing equations to produce a better
overall model result.”58 There are additional problems that arise in tuning, namely the
tuning (or changing) of one coefficient may necessitate the tuning of other coefficients.
Thus, changing one coefficient could push other coefficients outside an acceptable
range.59
Despite these uncertainties, climate modelers have been able to make some
successful predictions. Specifically, they have been able to develop models that have
accurately reproduced actual real world phenomena. This has been shown in their ability
to replicate past climate changes, and predict present climates with the necessary base
input.60 The IPCC reports;
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Coupled models can provide credible simulations of both the present
annual mean climate and the climatological seasonal cycle over broad
continental scales for most variables of interest for climate
change…Confidence in the ability of models to predict future climates is
increased by the ability of several models to reproduce the warming trend
in the 20th century surface air temperature when driven by radiative
forcing due to increasing greenhouse gases and sulphate aerosols.61

Section III – The Empirical Adequacy of Model-Tested Theories
Recall that van Fraassen wrote that “Science aims to give us theories which are
empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves a belief only that it is
empirically adequate.”62 Moreover, a theory is empirically adequate if what it says about
observable things about events in the world is true and “…such a theory has at least one
model that all the actual phenomenon fit inside.”63 When a scientist accepts a theory, he
considers the theory accurate with regard to the observable. Recall also that according to
van Fraassen’s view, what is observable is, in part, a function of what the epistemic
community designates as observable. Further, observation cannot be described in finality.
In the climate science community, a theory of how the climate system works has
been developed, including how certain forcings affect the natural climate system. This
theory is composed of a family of structures that van Fraassen calls models. Within each
model there is a family of substructures, such as accounts of air and water circulation and
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accounts of atmospheric chemistry and physics (among others). Parts and combinations
of these substructures have been deemed as candidates for direct representation by
observable phenomena; these are the empirical substructures. In modeling the natural
climate system (primarily through the use of GCMs), the substructures are accounted for
and represented by the mathematical formulas that make up the GCM. The climate
model is then run and the predictions that result are the appearances (according to van
Fraassen). If the appearances (the results of experiment, measurements, etc) are
isomorphic to the empirical substructures, then the theory can properly be said to be
empirically adequate. In other words, if the results of the GCM run match up with actual,
observable climate phenomenon, then the theory underlying the model can be said to be
empirically adequate.
Recall that climate models are used to account for past climate changes as well as
to predict future climate changes. Since the timeline in which future predictions are
made hundreds to thousands of years in the future, it is often very difficult, if not
impossible, to compare the predicted results against the actual results. In other words, in
the case of future predictions, there is no way of knowing whether or not the appearances
are the same as, or similar to, the empirical substructures. Thus, in terms of being able to
predict future climate, the theories that climate models are based on do not seem to be
empirically adequate by the standards that van Fraassen has outlined. In fact, it makes no
sense to talk about empirical adequacy, since the future, in the present, is not observable.
Empirical adequacy speaks only to what is observable.
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Even though the future

predictions cannot yet be deemed empirically adequate, this fact cannot be held against
GCMs because future predictions say nothing about current empirical adequacy.
But what of the aim of predicting past climate changes? As mentioned above,
many of the climate models in use today are parameterized to meet the recorded
conditions and changes of past climates. In this instance, the modelers know what the
outcome of their experiment (the model simulated climate) should be; it should
effectively simulate past climates. In this sense, the appearances (the model outcome)
can be compared against the empirical substructures (the past recorded climate). In the
instance that the results are not isomorphic, scientists return to the model to parameterize
and calibrate it so that the appearances and the empirical substructures are in line. Many
of today’s models are able to match the outcomes of actual recorded historical climates.64
Thus, with regards to the aim of accounting for past climate changes, the theories on
which these climate models are based can be properly called empirically adequate.
Taking these two aims together suggests that the predictions of future climate
change that are generated by climate models will also exhibit the empirical adequacy of
the theories behind the models, since the same theories are used to predict both past and
future climates. Although scientists can’t compare their predictions of the future with
what actually happens yet, they can test their model (and thus the theory that the model is
based) by comparing their results to past climates. If the model output and the past
recorded results are in line, then the theory can be said to be empirically adequate. This
holds even if they can’t compare their predictions for the future with the actual empirical

64

Working Group I, Executive Summary.

23

outcomes. Presumably, the interactions and relationships that make up the natural
climate system will remain the same. Predicting what will happen if one of these
relations changes can occur only through the use of modeling, since the climate system
cannot be replicated in a lab. The theory that drives the models making these predictions
is the same theory that has been tested through the comparison of model results with
actual, past climate activities.

Section IV - Inductive Risk and Climate Modeling
Given the need to predict future climate change (so that policy can be made to
adapt to and slow down the process), what can be said of theories (and the models that
represent them) that are empirically adequate to a significant degree, but have not yet
achieved the ideal of empirical adequacy? Many have argued that because of the implicit
uncertainties in such predictions, it is foolish and unnecessary to act on them.65
However, I hold that this is not the case. I claim that this problem can be dealt with by
coupling the idea of inductive risk (proposed by Douglas) with the proven empirical
adequacy of the theories that drive the models that accurately account for past and present
climate changes.
In the article “Inductive Risk and Values in Science” Heather Douglas argues that
“…because of inductive risk, or the risk of error, non-epistemic values are required in
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science wherever non-epistemic consequences of error should be considered.”66
Expanding on Hempel’s idea of inductive risk, Douglas argues that inductive risk is a
relevant aspect of the entire scientific process, not just in accepting or rejecting
hypotheses. Specifically, there is inductive risk for accepting methodologies, data, and
interpretations.67 I would like to expand on this idea and add that there are indirect nonepistemic consequences that should necessarily be considered in taking too seriously, or
not seriously enough the results of climate model predictions of future climate change.
It is commonly accepted that non-epistemic values have a legitimate role to play
in the direct application of scientific knowledge in society. However, my point is
different than this. First, it is different because we do not yet have scientific knowledge
(or, for van Fraassen, complete empirical adequacy); rather, all that we have are
predictions generated by theories that have been shown to be empirically adequate on
other accounts (accurately predicting past and present climates). While someday the
model-generated predictions will be able to be compared to the actual results, and the
predictions can be confirmed or rejected, that information is not available today. All that
there is to go on are predictions that are made by models that have been shown to exhibit
a high degree of empirical adequacy in their ability to account for past and present
climate, but not yet for future climate. Second, the predictions have no direct impact on
society – there are no direct social or ethical consequences that arise from the predictions
themselves. Unlike results of some research programs, these predictions cannot be
applied to design biological weapons or to make more effective bombs (endeavors that
66
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many would agree are unethical on many grounds); they can serve only as guides to
direct research goals. Predictions alone have no intended or unintended consequences.
Rather, incorrectly acting (or not acting) on them has unintended consequences. In other
words, either wrongfully accepting or wrongfully rejecting the predictions about future
climate change (and the consequent action or inaction) has unintended consequences.
The predictions should be used as guides to develop effective policy to slow down
climate change as well as to adapt to climate change. On this account of inductive risk,
scientists have the responsibility of detailing and communicating their predictions and the
risks associated with their predictions to policymakers. In turn, policymakers have the
responsibility of calculating the inductive risk and acting appropriately.68
In light of the decision at hand (whether or not to risk losing large amounts of
resources by erroneously adopting climate change mitigation policy or to risk suffering
potentially disastrous consequences of erroneously choosing not to adopt climate change
mitigation policy), it is important to investigate what is at stake. Earlier in chapter I, I
presented a brief overview of what stands to happen if nothing is done about climate
68
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change. Here, I will focus on the other side of the coin – namely, I will investigate what
lies behind the objection that there is too much to lose by wrongfully (or even rightfully)
adopting climate change mitigation policy. First, I will show that since climate change is
not solely an economic problem, economic considerations should not be the only values
appealed to. Second, while there is admitted uncertainty with regards to the projections
that the IPCC makes, there is even more uncertainty surrounding the economic
projections.

The Problem of Values
The self-proclaimed Skeptical Environmentalist, Bjørn Lomborg, is probably one
of the most notable opponents of climate change mitigation policy. His opposition is
based solely on the fact that the benefits of climate change abatement policies will be
enjoyed many years in the future, while the price tag of such action is a burden of the
present. According to Lomborg (and other economists) the costs of a climate change
protection policy will range anywhere from 1.5 to 2 percent of global GDP (this is
roughly between 480 and 640 billion dollars).69

Lomborg claims that initially it will be

relatively cheap to make emissions cuts, but it will become progressively more
expensive. Thus, the costs of reduction will increase over time; the cost in 2050 will be
about 2 percent of the OECD countries’ GDP and 4 percent in 2100.70 Additionally,
Lomborg argues that with time the global GDP is predicted to increase, so the
consequences of climate change need not elicit worry;
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Global warming will not decrease food production, it will probably not
increase storminess or the frequency of hurricanes, it will not increase the
impact of malaria or indeed cause more deaths. It is even unlikely that it
will cause more flood victims, because a much richer world will protect
itself better.71
He holds that to spend 2 percent of the global GDP on climate change would be foolish,
and that such money would be better spent on worthier causes. He concludes, “To put it
squarely, what matters to our and our children’s future is not primarily decided within the
IPCC framework, but within the WTO framework.”72
Perhaps Lomborg is right –based solely on economic considerations (assuming
his figures are correct) to choose to take substantial action towards mitigation is
irrational. However, to categorize climate change as solely an economic problem is
erroneous. Climate change will inevitably have ethical, social, ecological, and
agricultural effects, among others (see chapters I and III for more detail). While
economic considerations are surely important, other values should be taken into
consideration. To choose not to do anything about climate change in the present based
solely on economic considerations is to ignore other important values. In support of this
account, Jamieson offers an argument against what he calls the management approach to
climate change. The management approach to climate change draws on techniques from
economic theory for guidance towards policy. In general, it seeks to manipulate behavior
by controlling economic incentives. While Jamieson agrees that economic considerations
in policy are important, he holds that looking solely to economics for answers is a
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mistake. First, economic efficiency is only one of many values that is important, and
second, economics tends to generalize human interests.73 He writes;
It seems plain that people are motivated by a broad range of concerns,
including concern for family and friends, and religious, moral, and
political ideals. And it seems just as plain that people sometimes sacrifice
their own interests for what they regard to be a greater, sometimes
impersonal, good…People often act in ways that are contrary to what we
might predict on narrowly economic grounds, and moreover, they
sometimes believe that it would be wrong or inappropriate even to take
economic considerations into account.74
Since human motivations differ from person to person and circumstance to circumstance,
assuming that all individuals are motivated by self-interest all of the time is fallacious.
Other values may come into play and should be considered. In the case of global climate
change, its effects include more than its economic effects. Thus, when calculating the
inductive risk, it is important to consider the effects that climate change will have
socially, ethically, ecologically, etc. The inductive risk of adopting climate change
mitigation policies and not adopting climate change mitigation policies should therefore
include a consideration of all relevant values; to consider only the economic values
would leave the calculation incomplete. For instance, values such as fairness, political
and social stability, human rights considerations, the ability of a nation to sustain itself,
national self-determination, biodiversity, and ecological integrity are all values that
should be considered. None of these values are represented in economic analysis, and it
is not clear that they do have a market value. While it is beyond the scope of this project
to develop and argue for a comprehensive list of values that should be considered, it is
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not unreasonable to assume that these values are at least equal to or of greater weight
(when considered together) than only economic values.75
How do these values weigh out on either side of the decision at hand? In chapter
I, I detailed what stands to happen if climate change goes unchecked; in general, it is
predicted that there will be global impacts (many of which are predicted to be severe) that
will be felt socially, politically, and ecologically. Moving towards climate mitigation
will also have an effect in some of these areas. For instance, some societies will be
forced to adopt more sustainable ways of living, or pay the increased cost of maintaining
a highly consumptive lifestyle. Others will be forced to adjust to new taxes, and the
effects that they will have on the economy. Depending on the type of abatement that is
agreed upon, the cost of energy has the potential to increase until greener technologies
are developed and implemented; this could consequently cause the costs of goods and
75
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services to increase in some nations. However, most of these burdens are likely to fall on
highly industrialized countries - those countries that will have to make the most
transitions in order to reduce emissions. While reducing emissions will certainly be a
challenge, those nations that will be forced to make the biggest changes are also the
nations that have the economic and technological resources to effectively adapt to the
changes that are in order. Additionally, mechanisms can be adopted that will effectively
lessen the load for industrialized nations, such as emissions trading.
As a matter of summary, then, one problem with relying solely on economic
models is that they fail to take into account other relevant values. When considering
some of these values, it is clear that there will be consequences in these areas if climate
change policy is either wrongfully accepted or wrongfully rejected. However, it appears
that wrongfully accepting the policy poses less of a risk since the effects will largely
occur in those nations that have the best capacity to adapt to them. Conversely,
wrongfully rejecting climate change mitigation policy has the potential to cause much
more severe impacts (socially, politically, and ecologically), largely on those nations with
low adaptive capacities.76

The Empirical Adequacy of Economic Models
In addition to considering other relevant values, it is helpful to examine the
empirical adequacy of economic models, since there is seemingly so much to lose
(economically speaking) in wrongfully accepting climate change mitigation policy. To
start, there are several problems associated with economic modeling. Many of the
76
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problems that economic models face are due to the fact that they are driven primarily by
questionable assumptions (in human behavior, market trends, political trends, etc). These
problems are inherent with economic analysis, but they are amplified when applied to
events that will occur tens to hundreds of years in the future. Consequently, the outputs
of the model depend upon the assumptions the modelers make and it is often the case that
models of the same scenario can achieve drastically different outputs.77
To begin, there are problems with assigning market values to non-market goods,
such as the costs of species extinction, the loss of biodiversity, and the loss of human life.
In other words, the loss of non-market goods won’t be considered because they can’t be
entered into the equation simply because they don’t have a market value; the model fails
to account for all that we value. In addition, economic analysis tools employ discounting,
which is based on the assumption that future costs and benefits are worth less than
present costs and benefits.78 Compounding the problem is the fact future people can’t be
compensated for irreversible losses. Additionally, since the specifics surrounding the
timing, severity, and placement of climate change impacts cannot be known, it becomes
extremely difficult, if not impossible to predict the costs of such impacts.
Moreover, there is also difficulty with the valuation of policies set to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. On this subject, McKibben and Wilcoxen write:
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The costs of policies that would limit greenhouse gas emissions are
highly uncertain. The reason, in large part, is that baseline emissions are
very difficult to predict. [Baseline emissions are “the greenhouse gas
emissions that would occur in the absence of a climate change policy.”79]
The cost of reducing emissions to a target level depends heavily on how
much they would have grown otherwise: the more quickly emissions
grow in the absence of policy, the larger will be the reductions needed to
reduce them to a given target. Not only that, but reductions will have to
be made a lot sooner, and will hence be more expensive in present value
terms, when baseline emissions are growing rapidly.
Many factors affect the baseline path of the world economy: the
rates of population growth in different countries; the age structure,
educational attainment and labour productivity of those populations; the
rates of productivity growth within individual industries; the rates of
convergence of developing country incomes and productivity to the levels
prevailing in developed countries (or the lack of such convergence);
OPEC’s production decisions; new developments in the technology of
fossil fuel extraction; technical progress in conservation and fuel
efficiency; the discovery of new fuel deposits and reserves; and even the
degree of social and economic integration between countries. As a result,
the economy is very difficult to predict over long spans of time and past
attempts have been generally far off the mark. Plausible alternative
assumptions about these factors can lead to vastly different emissions
trajectories.80
Not only is the baseline path of the economy and emissions nearly impossible to predict
in the long-term, but there are further uncertainties in calculating the costs of reducing
emissions. First, there are several key economic parameters that are not known precisely:
short and long-term price elasticities of demand for different fuels; the rate at which the
consumption of household demands change as income rises; the degree of substitutability
between products from different countries; the intertemporal elasticity of substitutions ;
the elasticity of the labor supply; and reasons why more efficient energy supplies have
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not been adopted yet.81 Furthermore, there are uncertainties in identifying and
calculating the indirect benefits of climate change mitigation policy. For instance, it has
been speculated that a policy that incorporated a tax on emissions could decrease the need
for other taxes (because the emissions tax would raise government revenue). As a result
of all of the aforementioned uncertainties, the results of economic models differ, even
when modeling the same scenarios.82 A final uncertainty that cannot be controlled for in
the economic analysis of climate change is the simple fact that there is no way to predict
how humans are going to react to the consequences of climate change. This problem is
compounded when one takes into account that the exact timing, placement, and severity
of the impacts are still unknown. In sum, it is impossible to predict how individuals and
nations are going to react to the many changes that climate change will instigate, thus, it
is also impossible to put an accurate price tag on it.
Given all of these uncertainties, just how reliable are economic forecasts? Or, in
other words, are economic models empirically adequate? Consider the following
example. In a recent article in The Wall Street Journal, reporter Justin Lahart detailed a
survey on the accuracy of economic predictions in the bond market. He wrote;
Using quarterly forecasts compiled by the Philadelphia Fed, Mr. Montier
found that , over the past dozen years, whenever economists have
predicted that 10-year yields would rise in the following 12 months, they
have ended up being right only 45% of the time. Quarter-ahead forecasts
for rising bond yields are even less accurate – they’re right only 22% of
the time.83
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Factors influencing the bond market include the state of the economy, other markets,
current business trends, and current (or predicted) government policy (especially having
to do with new taxes), among others. Of course, the farther into the future a prediction is
made, the harder it will be to predict the influential trends. In general though, the bond
market is a relatively specific market with relatively identifiable variables. As the
variables increase, as in the case of predicting the GDP for a given year for the United
States, projections become even more uncertain. In fact, economists admit that “their
models fall far short of simulating something as complex as the U.S. economy.”84
While there is no way to know (in the present) how accurate the economic models
surrounding climate change will be, there is good reason to doubt them when taking into
account the trouble the economists have predicting much smaller, short term economic
trends. Some economists have even turned down the task of modeling climate change
policy, stating that “We couldn’t possibly run something like this through and come up
with anything meaningful.”85 In general then, it seems as if economic models can
exhibit some empirical adequacy some of the time (from the example above, 45% and
22% respectively). However, as the predictions reach farther into the future, and the
variables become greater, the empirical adequacy of the models declines greatly, as
modelers are assuming more about future trends.
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Choosing To Act On Model-Generated Climate Predictions
Returning to the question at hand – in employing inductive risk, which is it
rational to choose: the possibility of wasting precious economic resources, or the
possibility of someday facing the consequences of unchecked global climate change?
Put another way, should climate change mitigation policy be adopted or rejected, based
on the predictions put forth by the IPCC? In the case of climate change, wrongfully
rejecting the predictions, and thus not developing effective policy, would lead to a global
ecological catastrophe with severe social and political ramifications (or a complete
unpreparedness to adapt to the predicted changes).86 Wrongfully accepting the
predictions and developing policy that is not needed will lead to unnecessary expenses,
with notable social impacts. On the other hand, if we accept the predictions and develop
effective policy, and the predictions are correct, the goal of mitigating and/or adapting to
the predicted changes will be met. Finally, by correctly rejecting the predictions, and not
developing policy, we will be no better or worse off.
It has been shown that economic models exhibit a lower degree of empirical
adequacy than GCMs. Specifically, economic models are unable to reliably predict longterm economic trends; conversely, GCMs have been shown to accurately predict past and
present climate changes. Consequently, it is more likely that successful predictions will
be made by models exhibiting a high degree of empirical adequacy than those models
exhibiting low degrees of empirical adequacy. Additionally, in order to consider all
necessary non-epistemic values, more than just economic values need to be considered.

86

Working Group II, Summary for Policymakers.

36

Economic models do not account for these other important values, so to make a decision
just on the output of economic models would be incomplete. Specifically, as shown in
chapter I (and developed further in chapter III), unchecked climate change will have
social, political, and ecological consequences. While moving towards climate change
mitigation will also have consequences in these realms, they will be far less severe in
most instances (since mitigation can be planned). Thus, by taking into consideration the
empirical adequacy of both GCMs and economic models, as well as the relevant nonepistemic values, it seems that the inductive risk of needlessly adopting policy
(wrongfully accepting the predictions) is less than the inductive risk or wrongfully
rejecting policy (wrongfully rejecting the predictions). In other words, all things
considered, at this point in time it is rational to choose to act on the predictions put forth
by the IPCC based on what stands to occur if the predictions are wrongfully rejected.

Conclusion
In conclusion, by coupling the idea of empirical adequacy with the idea of
inductive risk, it is rational to act on model-generated climate predictions. Because the
theories that drive GCMs have been shown to be empirically adequate in their ability to
account for past and present climate, and these same theories generate future accounts of
climate events, there is good reason to hold that they will exhibit empirical adequacy on
this front as well (presuming that the relationships and interactions that account for
climate change will remain the same). Despite the fact that these theories have not
achieved complete empirical adequacy, a framework for considering these predictions
can be found in Douglas’s conception of inductive risk. Specifically, by considering the
37

non-epistemic consequences of wrongfully rejecting the predictions vs. wrongfully
accepting them, it is rational to choose to accept and act on these predictions.
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Chapter III – Rawls’s The Law of Peoples and Climate Change

Introduction
Since it has been shown that it is rational to act on the model-generated
predictions associated with climate change, and that this responsibility lies primarily with
policymakers, a framework from which to deal with these predictions needs to be
developed. To this end, this chapter explores the applicability of Rawls’s The Law of
Peoples to the problem of climate change. Section I gives a brief summary of Rawls’s
theory, focusing on those aspects of his work that are most relevant to the problem at
hand. Section II details how climate change can threaten the well-orderedness of just or
decent peoples, in at least three distinct ways: by threatening the ability of societies to
meet their human rights requirements, by threatening the necessary public and political
infrastructures, and finally by infringing on the abilities of just and decent regimes to
meet their respective, distinct requirements. In these instances, the duty of assistance can
be extended to protect the well-orderedness of those peoples in danger. Section III
details an alternative Rawlsian route to dealing with the problem of climate change.
Namely, it may be the case that behind the veil ignorance, parties will agree to a ninth
principle to be added to the Law of Peoples that will address the problem of externalities.
Finally, section IV deals with the problem of free riders and climate change. This section
details how, as a last resort, strict measures of coercion can be taken against those
peoples that threaten the well-orderedness of other peoples by refusing to act on their
duty to assist. I conclude that the framework that Rawls offers in The Law of Peoples is
able to adequately deal with the problem of climate change.
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Section I - Summary of Rawls’s The Law of Peoples
In The Law of Peoples John Rawls outlines his principles and norms for
international law.87 The Law of Peoples applies to the Society of Peoples which Rawls
defines as “all those peoples who follow the ideals and principles of the Law of Peoples
in their mutual relations.”88 To be a member of the Society of Peoples a nation must have
either a constitutional liberal democracy or a non-liberal, but decent, form of
constitutional and republican government. Rawls writes that the aim of the Law of
Peoples is to realize the establishment of all societies into either of the above-mentioned
regimes.
To arrive at the principles to govern the relations of the Society of Peoples, Rawls
employs two original position arguments. The first is set at the domestic level. In this
original position, members of the same society are choosing the principles of justice that
will regulate their society; representatives are to agree on fair terms of cooperation that
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will be used to govern the basic structure of society.89 Hence, the political conception of
justice that will be agreed upon is the one that is both reasonable and rational and has the
best reasons in support of it.
In the second original position, the liberal conception of justice that was chosen in
the first original position will be extended to the Law of Peoples; this process occurs at
the international level between members of separate, but equal, liberal, democratic
regimes in which parties choose between different formulations of the principles of the
Law of Peoples.90

Again, the parties are represented as rational and are represented

symmetrically (therefore fairly). Each representative in the original position represents
only one people as a corporate body and seeks to protect the fundamental interests of this
people. These interests include political independence and civil liberties, the peoples’
security, territory, and well-being and self-respect. The principles that would be agreed
upon would be the following (or versions of the following):
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence
are to be respected by other peoples.
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them.
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention.
5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for
reasons other than self-defense.
6. Peoples are to honor human rights.
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of
war.
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8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living unfavorable
conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social
regime.91
The above principles are recognized as principles of political conduct that will govern the
members of the Society of Peoples; they constitute the fundamental charter of the Law of
Peoples. Together, they dictate ways of forming and regulating associations of peoples
as well as standards of fairness in trade and cooperation.
All members of the Society of Peoples need not be liberal peoples. Here the role
of toleration emerges. Rawls explains that to tolerate means
…not only to refrain from exercising political sanctions – military,
economic, or diplomatic – to make a people change its ways. To tolerate
also means to recognize these non-liberal societies as equal participating
members in good standing in the Society of Peoples, with certain rights
and obligations, including the duty of civility requiring that they offer
other peoples public reasons appropriate to the Society of Peoples for their
actions.92
Rawls holds that liberal peoples must cooperate and assist all other peoples in good
standing, including decent peoples. Decent peoples are those non-liberal peoples whose
basic institutions of society live up to specified standards of political right and justice.
Additionally, these peoples must be able to justify a reasonable and just law for the
Society of Peoples.
Rawls also addresses the problem of burdened societies in the global community.
He defines burdened societies as societies that “while they are not expansive or
aggressive, lack the political and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how,
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and, often, the material and technological resources needed to be well ordered.”93 Wellordered societies have a duty to assist burdened societies (in line with principle eight of
the Law of Peoples). Rawls points out that even if a society is not wealthy, it can still be
a well-ordered society. Thus, while acting on their duty of assistance, the aim for all
parties involved, is to “realize and preserve just institutions, and not simply to increase,
much less maximize indefinitely, the average level of wealth, or the wealth of any society
or any particular class in society.”94 The aim of the duty of assistance is to move
burdened societies into the Society of Peoples; this is the target of the duty of assistance
and assistance can cease once the target has been reached.

Section II - Climate Change and the Well-Orderedness of Just and Decent Peoples
Rawls’s eighth principle for The Law of Peoples states, “Peoples have a duty to
assist other peoples living in unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or
decent political and social regime.”95 Further, Rawls describes the goal of the Law of
Peoples as the establishment of all societies into either a liberal or decent regime. With
this aim in mind, it would presumably be the case that the eighth principle could be
extended to include a duty of assistance to those peoples that are in danger of
experiencing unfavorable conditions that would severely jeopardize, or even destroy, the
just or decent regime of an individual society. In other words, if the aim of the Law of
Peoples is the establishment of just or decent societies, then it follows that there should
be a duty to assist those societies that are in danger of having such regimes compromised.
93
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Thus, the question of whether or not global climate change would create the
aforementioned conditions needs to be addressed. I contend that global climate will lead
to conditions that will threaten the well-orderedness of just or decent societies in at least
three distinct ways. First, climate change will leave some societies unable to meet their
human rights requirements. Second, climate change will render some societies unable to
maintain the right sort of public political infrastructure and political culture. Additionally,
the predicted effects of climate change will leave some peoples unable to meet the further
requirements of well-ordered liberal democratic societies or well-decent societies.

Climate change and Human Rights: Will climate change leave any society unable to
meet its human rights requirements?
Rawls explains that human rights “set a necessary, though not sufficient, standard
for the decency of domestic political and social institutions.”96 Rawls explains that these
rights include;
…the right to life (to the means of subsistence and security); to liberty (to
freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a sufficient
measure of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of religion and
thought); to property (personal property); and to formal equality as
expressed by the rules of natural justice (that is, that similar cases be
treated similarly).97
In addition, Rawls cites some articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) that may be included in his conception of human rights; specifically, he cites
Articles 3 to 18. The rights mentioned in the UDHR include the rights to life, liberty, and
security; freedom from slavery; the right to freedom from torture and degrading
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treatment; the right to recognition before the law; the right to nondiscrimination and
equal protection before the law; the right to an effective remedy for an act violating
fundamental rights; the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile; the
right to a fair and public hearing to determine the rights and obligations of criminal
charges; the right to the presumption of innocence until proven guilty; the right to
freedom from arbitrary interference; the right to freedom of movement and residence; the
right to asylum; the right to a nationality; the right to refuse marriage; the right to
property; and the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.98 In short, these
are necessary conditions for any form of social cooperation, and are requirements for
well-orderedness in just and decent regimes. Thus, if they are directly infringed upon, or
if society’s ability to pursue these rights is infringed upon, then the well-orderedness of
that society is threatened.
Of all the rights listed above, it is presumably the case that climate change will
have the potential to at least affect the ability of a people to maintain and pursue the right
to subsistence. In the paper “Political Authority and Human Rights,” author David Reidy
writes,
But when Rawls focuses directly on the basic human rights possessed by
individual persons, he interprets the right to subsistence as a right to a
‘minimum economic security’ including ‘general all-purpose economic
means’ sufficient to make ‘sensible and rational use’ of the liberties
afforded within one’s own domestic political order…A more charitable
reading, then, would have Rawls committed to a basic human right to a
substantial economic and social minimum relative to the decent or liberal
democratic domestic order to which one belongs, a minimum (in all cases
except perhaps the atypical case of an isolated and primitive indigenous
98
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people) beyond what typically comes to mind when one thinks of mere
subsistence.99
Thus, at minimum, is appears that any substantial threat to economic, food, or water
security would pose a threat on the ability of a peoples to maintain and pursue the right to
subsistence, and possibly pose a threat to the well-orderedness of the society. The wellorderedness of a society would be threatened in those instances when a people’s
resources are degraded to such a degree that, even with trade it is no longer viable, or a
people is left with nothing to trade in order to secure its necessities.
Does climate change pose a substantial threat to economic, food, and/or water
security? The IPCC reports that climate change does indeed pose such a threat. They
write that “the vulnerability of these systems varies with geographic location, time, and
social, economic, and environmental conditions.”100 In general, as a result of the increase
in temperature, water availability is expected to be reduced in those countries that are
already water-stressed. Additionally, sea-level rise will lead to the contamination of
freshwater sources of many coastal nations and small island states.101 Food and
agricultural security will also be threatened. The IPCC writes,
…assessments indicate that yields in some crops in tropical locations
would decrease generally with even minimal increases in temperature,
because such crops are near their maximum temperature tolerance and
dryland/rainfed agriculture predominates. Where there is also a large
decrease in rainfall, tropical crop yields would be even more adversely
affected…Most studies indicate that global mean annual temperature
increases of a few °C or greater would prompt food prices to increase due
99
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to a slowing in the expansion of global food supply relative to growth in
global food demand (established, but incomplete)…studies find that
climate change would lower incomes of vulnerable populations and
increase the absolute number of people at risk of hunger…102
Specifically, those most vulnerable to diminishing food and agricultural security include
peoples in Africa, parts of Asia, and on some small island states.103
Thus, it appears that climate change will affect the ability of some peoples to
internally secure and pursue the right to subsistence. That is, the ability of some peoples
to maintain an acceptable social minimum, in accord with Rawls’s interpretation of the
right to subsistence, will be diminished. (I will discuss economic security below.)
Consequently, the well-orderedness of some peoples will be threatened if, even with trade
they are left unviable, or if the country is left with nothing to trade in order to secure its
resources. In these instances, the duty to assist is triggered.104

Climate Change and the Public Political Infrastructure: Will climate change leave any
society unable to sustain the right sort of public political infrastructure, or solidarity in
political culture?
Rawls points out that citizens of a liberal and decent societies are regarded as
having the two moral powers – “a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a
conception of the good.”105 The role of the principles of justice is to “protect citizens’
higher-order interests; they are guaranteed within the framework of the liberal
constitution and the basic structure of society.”106 In order for the body of citizens to
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exercise and develop these two moral powers, the right type of constitution and basic
structure need to be in place. In general, these requirements demand a secure economy
and a rule of law, as well as the preservation of those things that give a people its identity
as a people. Therefore, the ability of climate change to affect these systems needs to be
explored.

Small Islands States and Economic Stability
One way in which climate change could affect the systems necessary for the basic
structure of a well-ordered peoples is by destroying or severely debilitating a people’s
economy. The IPCC reports that “The economic sectors that support the [human]
settlement are affected because of changes in resource productivity or changes in market
demand for the goods and services produced there.”107 In addition, “Settlements with
little economic diversification and where a high percentage of incomes derive from
climate-sensitive primary resource industries (agriculture, forestry, and fisheries) are
more vulnerable than more diversified settlements (high confidence).”108
While all countries are expected to feel the impact of climate change on their
economies, small island states are predicted to experience the worst affects.109 On this
matter, the IPCC reports
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The projected sea-level rise of 5 mm yr -1 for the next 100 years would
cause enhanced coastal erosion, loss of land and property, dislocation of
land and people, increased risk from storm surges, reduced resilience of
coastal ecosystem, saltwater intrusion into freshwater resources, and high
resource costs to respond to and adapt to these changes (high
confidence)…Limited arable land and soil salinization makes agriculture
of small island states, both for domestic food production and cash crop
exports, highly vulnerable to climate change (high confidence)…Tourism,
an important source of income and foreign exchange for many islands,
would face severe disruption from climate change and sea-level rise (high
confidence).110
The effect that climate change will have on tourism on these areas is of great concern.
The IPCC reports that these islands will suffer both direct and indirect effects in this area;
for instance, the loss of beaches and degraded coastal ecosystems (as a result of sea level
rise), coupled with the warmer winters that are projected for the developed countries of
the north may leave these destinations less attractive. A further concern related to
tourism is that it is a major source of employment in many of these areas; for example,
this industry represents 70% of the labor force in the Bahamas and 40% in Malta.111
Thus, any impact that climate change has on tourism, will affect the job opportunities and
well-being of the laborers in these areas.
Small islands are also less likely to be able to adapt to the effects of climate
change due to their small physical sizes, limited natural resources, relative isolation, the
southern boundary of the permafrost zones in Asia would result in a change of thermokarst and thermal
erosion with negative impacts on social infrastructure and industries (medium confidence).” (Working
Group II, 14.) In Europe “River flood hazard will increase across much of Europe (medium to high
confidence); in coastal areas the risk of flooding, erosion, and wetland loss will increase substantially with
implications for human settlement, industry, tourism, agriculture, and coastal natural habitats.” (Working
Group II, 15.) In Latin America, “Coastal settlements, productive activities, infrastructure, and mangrove
ecosystems would be negatively affected by sea-level rise (medium confidence). (Working Group II, 15.)
In North America, “Weather-related insured losses and public sector disaster relief payments in North
America have been increasing; insurance sector planning has not yet systematically included climate
change information, so there is potential for surprise (high confidence). (Working Group II, 16.)
110
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openness of their small economies that are very sensitive to external shocks and natural
disasters, undeveloped infrastructures, and limited funds and skills.112 The IPCC explains
that while small islands states contribute less than 1% of the global GHG emissions, they
are the most vulnerable to the consequences; even if a global effort (the Kyoto Protocol)
was adopted, it would be too late to make a significant difference for small island states –
“Therefore, climate change impacts are inevitable.”113
In general, climate change has the potential to affect the economies of almost all
nations, but its most severe effects will be borne by those peoples that do not have the
capacity to effectively adapt. Small islands states are especially vulnerable, and the
impacts that climate change will have on these nations’ economies will certainly threaten
the well-orderedness of these peoples, since climate change embodies the potential to
debilitate or completely destroy these peoples’ economies. Thus, in those cases where
the stability of the economy will be substantially affected by climate change, and
consequently affect the ability of a well-ordered society to remain as such, the duty of
assistance is triggered.

Climate Change and Cultural Threats
Rawls writes, “…it is surely, ceteris paribus, a good for individuals and
associations to be attached to their particular culture and to take part in its common
public and civic life.”114 To unnecessarily infringe on a people’s culture is to
unnecessarily infringe on their right to self-determination. With the predicted effects of
112
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climate change, many peoples are going to be forced to change the ways that they live,
and abandon priceless aspects of their culture. However, some of these impacts are going
to be harsher on certain populations than they are on others. Some peoples stand to lose
ecosystems that are considered national treasures, while others are going to have to give
up the traditions of their ancestors, and still others are going to lose invaluable symbols of
spirituality and history. In what follows, I will offer a few examples in support of this
claim, but it is important to note that this is far from a comprehensive list.
To begin, climate change is predicted to lead to the destruction or severe
impairment of ecosystems that some people depend on for their cultural and spiritual
livelihood. This is especially true in parts of Latin America. The local people inhabiting
parts of this region have strong ties to the land, both aesthetically and spiritually.115 The
IPCC writes that an increase in sea level “could affect monuments and historic sites of
Central America.”116 Indigenous peoples in the polar regions are also very susceptible to
the consequences of climate change. In these regions, “Harvesting [of fish] contributes to
community cohesion and self-esteem, and knowledge of wildlife and the environment
strengthens social relationships.”117 With the onset of climate change, the increase in
temperature, sea-level rise, and coastal erosion the range and abundance of keystone (for
the people) marine and terrestrial animals will be threatened; “At minimum, salmon,
herring, walrus, seals, whales, caribou, moose, and various species of waterfowl are
likely to undergo shifts in range and abundance. This will entail local adjustments in
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harvest strategies as well as in allocations of labor and resources.”118 Additionally,
changes in the seasons experienced in this region will also have profound effects on the
inhabitants. Consider the following;
For example, when sea-ice is late in forming, certain forms of hunting are
delayed or may not take place at all. When sea ice in the spring melts or
deteriorates too rapidly, it greatly decreases the length of the hunting
season. Many traditional foods are dried (e.g., walrus, whale, seal, fish,
and birds) in the spring and summer to preserve them for consumption
over the long winter months. When the air is too damp and wet during the
“dying” seasons, food becomes moldy and sour. The length of the wet
season also affects the ability to gather greens such as willow trees, beach
greens, dock, and wild celery.119
In sum, “‘the combination of alternative cultural lifestyles and altered subsistence
opportunities resulting from a warmer climate may pose the greatest threat of all to the
continuity of indigenous cultures in northern North America.’”120
A final example of a threatened culture lies in the peoples that inhabit small
islands states. Again, this culture is a risk of losing much of its subsistence and
traditional skills and knowledge, its community structure, and its villages and
settlements.121 Already
Sea-level rise and climate changes, coupled with environmental changes
have destroyed some very important and unique cultural and spiritual
sites, coastal protected areas, and traditional heritage sites in the Federated
States of Micronesia, Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, Niue, and Kiribati, and
118
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continue to threaten others…In Tuvalu, for instance, strong traditional ties
to land and sea constitute a vital component of local cosmology.122
The effects of climate change will have an impact on many cultures around the
world, but some are more severely threatened by others. As of now, many of the most
negative effects are still avoidable, and for those that are inevitable, there is still enough
time to prepare for them. Since for Rawls a peoples’ culture is part of its self-identity and
self-respect, to infringe upon on a peoples’ culture in a way that is both negative and
avoidable is to infringe upon their right to self-determination. Additionally, a peoples’
self-identity and their ability for self-determination are imperative for a society to become
and remain well-ordered. Thus, any negative, avoidable threat to the self-identity or
(unnecessary) threat to the self-determination of a peoples threatens the well-orderedness
of a peoples; climate change poses such a threat. Therefore, the duty of assistance is
triggered.

Climate Change and the Further Requirements of Well-Oderedness: Will climate
change affect the ability of liberal societies to meet their respective requirements of
well-orderedness?
Rawls writes that liberal peoples, while rational, are constrained by the
reasonable.123 This moral nature, in order to achieve stability for the right reasons, must
be sustained from one generation to the next. These reasonable interests allow peoples to
attain stability for the right reasons. Rawls explains, “Stability for the right reasons
describes a situation in which, over the course of time, citizens acquire a sense of justice
122
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that inclines them not only to accept but to act upon the principles of justice.”124 For
Rawls, a reasonably just constitutional democratic society meets three characteristic
principles:
the first enumerates basic rights and liberties of the kind familiar from a
constitutional regime;
the second assigns these rights, liberties, and opportunities a special
priority, especially with respect to the claims of the general good and
perfectionism values; and
the third assures for all citizens the requisite primary goods to enable them
to make intelligent and effective use of their freedoms.125
Rawls explains that the third principle requires certain types of institutions and
arrangements if a regime is to achieve stability for the right reasons:
(a) A certain fair equality of opportunity, especially in education and training.
(Otherwise, all parts of society cannot take part in the debates of public
reason or contribute to social and economic policies.)
(b) A decent distribution of income and wealth meeting the third condition of
liberalism: all citizens must be assured the all-purpose means necessary
for them to take intelligent and effective advantage of their basic
freedoms. (In the absence of this condition, those with wealth and income
tend to dominate those with less and increasingly to control political
power in their own favor.)
(c) Society as employer of last resort through general or local government, or
other social and economic policies. (The lack of a sense of long-term
security and of the opportunity for meaningful work and occupation is
destructive not only for citizen’s self-respect, but of their sense that they
are members of society and not simply caught in it.)
(d) Basic health care assured for all citizens.
(e) Public financing of elections and ways of assuring the availability of
public information on maters of policy. (A statement for the need for
these arrangements merely hints at what is needed both to ensure that
representatives and other officials are sufficiently independent of
particular social and economic interests and to provide the knowledge and
information upon which policies can be formed and intelligently assessed
by citizens.)126
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These requirements will serve to help protect the basic liberties and will help to prevent
excessive inequalities. Thus, the question must be asked, will the effects of climate
change have the potential to threaten these requirements and/or the three principles of a
just democratic society.
To begin, it is worth noting that it has already been shown that climate change has
the potential to affect the ability of a people to meet its human rights requirements as well
as its ability to sustain the right sort of public political infrastructure (as seen in the
possibility that climate change will effect both the stability of economies and the selfidentity of some peoples). If these requirements cannot be met, it would be very difficult,
if not impossible, to meet the further requirements of a well-ordered democratic society.
Nonetheless, it is worth exploring this possibility.
Depending on the relative wealth of a people (and therefore their adaptive
capacities), climate change may in fact have a profound impact on the ability of a society
to meet the aforementioned requirements.127 Climate change is going to demand lifestyle
changes to reduce the impacts of climate change, or as a result of the impacts of climate
change. The costs of maintaining food security, water security, dealing with new health
issues, and/or preparing for and recovering from weather events may create a burden that
can not be overcome, while at the same time maintaining the requisite structures for a just
democratic society. For example, the IPCC reports, “It is established, though
127
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incompletely, that climate change, mainly through increased extremes and
temporal/spatial shifts will worsen food security in Africa.”128 Additionally,
Adaptive capacity of human systems in Africa is low due to lack of
economic resources and technology, and vulnerability high as a result of
heavy reliance on rain-fed agriculture, frequent droughts and floods, and
poverty….Grain yields are expected to decrease for many scenarios,
diminishing food security, particularly in small food-importing countries
(medium to high confidence)…Increases in droughts, floods, and other
extreme events would add to stresses on water resources, food security,
human health, and infrastructures, and would constrain development in
Africa (high confidence).129
If there exists a country in Africa that is well-ordered and meets the aforementioned
criteria, but is susceptible to the problems described above, then it may be that its status
as a well-ordered, liberal society is in jeopardy. The characteristics and principles that
Rawls offers above are in place so as to ensure that all citizens can remain free and equal,
politically speaking. In order for this to occur, and as reflected above, the society must
be able to sustain a decent social minimum for all its citizens. Rawls describes this
minimum, “This covers at least the basic needs essential to a decent life, and presumably
more.”130 This foundation is needed to secure the idea of political equality and selfrespect in citizens. A citizen lacking in the basic needs will be politically withdrawn
from society, and will be more likely to see himself as inferior to his fellow citizens.
Rawls describes the social bases of self respect as “essential if citizens are to have a
lively sense of their worth as persons and to be able to advance their own ends with self-
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confidence.”131 If, for example, food or basic health care is only available to wealthier
citizens then the equality and self-respect of citizens cannot be assured. In general, the
severity of impacts that a society may face, coupled with its ability to adapt to these
impacts may affect the ability of a society to maintain the equality (and perhaps other
requirements) of all its citizens.
Thus, it seems to be the case that in some well-ordered, democratic countries
climate change may infringe upon their abilities to maintain the equality of their citizens.
If this is the case, then climate change can actually threaten the well-orderedness of some
democratic regimes. Thus, again, the duty of assistance is triggered.

Climate Change and the Further Requirements of Well-Orderedness: Will climate
change affect the ability of decent societies to meet their respective requirements of
well-orderedness?
For Rawls, a non-liberal society is decent if its “basic institutions meet certain
specified conditions of political right and justice and lead its people to honor a reasonable
and just law for the Society of Peoples.”132

One condition for such a society is that it

must secure the human rights of all its members, including
the right to life (to the means of subsistence and security); to liberty (to
freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a sufficient
131
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measure of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of religion and
thought); to property (personal property); and to formal equality as
expressed by the rules of natural justice (that is, that similar cases be
treated similarly).133
The rights and liberties outlined above are needed in order to secure that persons can
meet their duties and obligations, as well as be and remain cooperating members of
society.134 Second, the law of the decent people must be such that it imposes “bona fide
moral duties and obligations (distinct from human rights) on all persons within the
people’s territory.”135
While it has already been shown that climate change may affect a society’s ability
to meet its human right requirements, a decent society may also be in jeopardy if it
cannot provide its citizens with those resources necessary for them to meet their duties
and obligations and to remain cooperating members of society. As in the case with liberal
societies, things such as food and water security are some of the resources necessary to
sustain this standard. Those countries that are susceptible to the severe impacts of
climate change but do not have the wealth or resources to adapt are the nations that are
most in jeopardy. The IPCC reports that countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and
small island states will experience threats to their water and/or food security.
Additionally, it is in these same areas that the IPCC reports as having the least adaptive
capacity due to things such as lack of economic resources and technology, climate
sensitive agriculture, and small economies. 136 In these areas, it may be that the wellorderedness of some peoples may be threatened because the background resources that
133
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are necessary to sustain such a society is threatened. Therefore, the duty to assist is again
triggered.
In addition, even if these resources are sustained to a minimum degree, a decent
society also demands a certain type of public political infrastructure along with the rule of
law.137 While these societies need not be liberal, they must remain non-authoritarian. In
those cases when the background resources are in serious shortage, the rule of law and
the right sort of public political infrastructure will likely be left unstable. In some
instances it may be that they degrade entirely. In these instances, the duty to assist is
triggered.
Finally, decent societies, unlike liberal societies may have a national religion or
conception of the good. As a matter of self-determination, a decent society ought to be
allowed to pursue its chosen religion or conception of the good. Of course, this ability
may be threatened by the impacts of global climate change in any of the ways previously
mentioned. If the ability of a nation to pursue its conception of the good is threatened,
the to duty assist may be triggered.

The Duty to Assist
Thus, it is clear that global climate change will affect the ability of some decent
and some liberal societies to remain as such. Recall that Rawls’s duty to assist states:
“Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that
prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.”138 Further, the aim of
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the Law of Peoples is the establishment of all societies into either a liberal or decent
regime. With this aim in mind, the duty to assist could be proactively invoked to protect
those peoples that are in danger of experiencing unfavorable conditions that would
severely jeopardize, or even destroy, the ability of a society to remain well-ordered.
(However, Rawls himself never discusses such a possibility.) In other words, if the aim
of the Law of Peoples is the establishment of just or decent societies, then it follows that
there should be a duty to assist those societies that are in danger of having such regimes
compromised. Additionally, all members of the Society of Peoples are obligated by the
duty to assist, not just those members who are most responsible for the damage, and not
just the wealthiest societies. (However, the amount of wealth a society has can limit its
contributions.)
So, how then can Rawls’s duty to assist be extended to deal with this problem?
Presumably, there are two important steps that should be taken. First, there is a duty to
slow down or stop those processes that are causing the harm. Namely, those practices
that have lead to climate change need to be refined in such a way that they create no or
little threat. Further, there is a duty to help those countries that will suffer the
consequences of climate change adapt to the changes that will inevitably occur as a result
of global climate change. Since climate change is a global problem, brought on by each
member of the human race (admittedly, some societies have contributed more damage
than others), the solution needs to be one that adequately and fairly deals with these facts.
In general, the solution must be one that encompasses the participation and cooperation
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of all countries, especially those countries that have been shown to contribute the most to
the problem at hand.
In The Law of Peoples, Rawls writes that in the second original position peoples
will “formulate guidelines for setting up cooperative organizations and agree to standards
of fairness for trade as well as certain provisions for mutual assistance.”139 Presumably,
then, in the Society of Peoples, an agreement that dealt with the problem of climate
change could be formed. Additionally, it is important to note that for Rawls, the
principles that constitutes the charter of the Law of Peoples include, “Peoples are to
observe treaties and undertakings,” and “Peoples are equal and are parties to the
agreements that bind them.”140 Thus, once an agreement has been reached the parties to
the agreement (in this case, the whole of the Society of Peoples) would be bound to live
up to the agreement.141

Section III - An Alternative Rawlsian Route to Dealing With the Problem of Climate
Change
While extending the duty to assist is one viable way for dealing with the problem
of climate change within the Rawlsian framework, there may be another; namely, behind
the original position representatives may agree on a ninth principle that deals with the
problem of externalities. One reason to be concerned with externalities would be issues
of fairness. Specifically, it would presumably be unfair to force country A to bear the
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costs of country B’s action, while only B enjoys the benefits of such action. A second
reason that agents may be concerned with externalities has to do with efficiency; in other
words, aside from questions of fairness, externalities pose the risk of inefficiency. In
those instances where externalized costs are greater than the internalized gains the
behavior poses the risk of being a leach on social utility and cooperation, rather than a
contributor to it.
Recall that the second original position is set up to extend a liberal conception of
justice to the Law of Peoples; that is, they are deliberating over the content of the Law of
Peoples. The parties are restricted by a veil of ignorance that protects them from
knowledge of the size of the territory inhabited by those that they represent, the
population of those they represent, the strength of those that they represent, the
availability of natural resources in the territory, the level of economic development, and
other such information. They do know that there are conditions that make a democratic
society favorable. The representatives are to secure the interests of the parties that they
represent. Rawls writes, “Thus, they strive to protect their political independence and
their free culture with its civil liberties, to guarantee their security, territory, and the wellbeing of its citizens.”142 In addition, Rawls states a further interest – that of amourpropre. Rawls explains “…this interest shows itself in a people’s insisting on receiving
from other peoples a proper respect and recognition of their equality.”143 Behind the veil
of ignorance, the peoples are regarded as being equal, reasonable, and rational; thus, all
are prepared to offer and accept fair terms of social and political cooperation.
142
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Rawls

writes, “These fair terms are those that a people sincerely believes other equal peoples
might accept also; and should they do so, a people will honor the terms it has proposed
even in those cases where a people might profit from violating them.”144 In short, this is
a criterion of reciprocity. Under these conditions, Rawls was led to the eight principles
that serve as the charter for the Society of Peoples. The principles agreed upon rest on a
foundation of equality and equal rights for all peoples and all satisfy the criterion of
reciprocity. Under the same conditions, with the same interests in mind, it would
presumably be the case that the representatives would agree on a ninth principle: Peoples
have a duty to internalize externalities that threaten the ability of other peoples to
maintain territorial integrity.
Like the original eight principles, the proposed ninth principle would meet the
criteria of reciprocity and equality. With regards to reciprocity, this principle could be
sincerely proposed and could be reasonably accepted by others “without submitting to a
position of inferiority or domination.”145 In other words, it is based on reasons that all
behind the veil of ignorance could accept. These reasons are properly based on political
values (efficiency and fairness), and thus are reasons that all can accept; they are not
based on some particular comprehensive doctrine of the good or the like. Additionally,
the ninth principle meets the baseline of equality because it preserves the equality and
equal rights of all people by preventing one people from unfairly imposing themselves
and their damaging byproducts on another people. Consequently, by adopting such a
principle the representatives in the original position would serve to protect the
144
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fundamental interests of the parties that they represent. Specifically, this principle would
protect the territory and well-being of represented peoples by either prohibiting harmful
externalities, or demanding adequate compensation for harmful externalities. This
principle would also serve to protect the self-respect of the people. For example, a nation
that is subject to the harmful pollution of another country could come to see itself (and be
seen by the world) as a dumping ground for unwanted byproducts. Such a nation would
no longer be viewed as an equal, and would not be able to exercise its right of selfdetermination.

146

Evaluative Criteria for Realizing the Principle
The issue of identifying a proper procedure or mechanism for realizing this
principle in the real world is beyond the scope of this project. However, there are certain
criteria that any procedure or mechanism should meet. Presumably, the same criteria that
led to the agreement of the ninth principle (behind the veil of ignorance) should be the
standard that the realization of the principle should meet. Thus, any procedure that is
146
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adopted to deal with the internalization of harmful externalities should be fair, it should
protect the fundamental interests of the members of the Society of Peoples, it should
recognize all peoples as equals, and it should contain an element of mutuality. In
addition, any such procedure should be concerned with economic efficiency; because,
presumably, behind the original position, representatives will not only want to agree on
principles of trade that are free and fair, but also ones that maximize social benefits.
These criteria would lead to the adoption of a mechanism that was both fair and accepted
for the best reasons (reasons that all could agree to).
A fair mechanism for the specific case of climate change would be one that
fairly allocated emissions quotas (or in other words, offered a fair distribution of the
global atmosphere). This issue is perhaps the most fundamental issue that needs to be
addressed, for it will set parameters for the other criteria and will establish the playing
field for future interactions. In other words, establishing who has rights to what (a right
to pollute vs. a right to clean air, etc) is foundational. As a baseline, it seems clear that at
minimum, each people has a right to the commons to the extent that is needed to support
its own well-orderedness. This share cannot be sold or traded (within the Rawlsian
framework I have developed); if the aim of the Law of Peoples is the establishment of all
societies into just or decent regimes, then all societies must retain at least their minimum
share of the atmospheric commons that is needed to remain well-ordered. On the other
hand, no people has a right to harm or destroy the territory of another people. Since wellorderedness is a fundamental interest shared by all peoples, the amount of the
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atmospheric commons that is necessary for well-orderedness cannot be infringed upon by
another or used by another society.
Beyond this initial distribution, though, it’s not so clear how the remainder of
the commons (presuming there is a leftover) should be distributed. As Singer proposes,
there are various ways to divide the atmosphere: according to past offenses, according to
population at either present or future levels, according to economic activity, or according
to energy needs (this could be a function of standard of living, geography, level of
industrialization, etc).147 While I don’t claim to have a definitive answer to this, there is
something to be said for the proposal that Singer himself endorses: allocate quotas
according to “equal per capita future entitlements to a share of the capacity of the
atmospheric sink, tied to the current United Nations projections of population growth per
country in 2050.”148 In other words, whatever is leftover in the pie after the initial
distribution should be divided according to equal per capita allocations (of a global
emissions cap) based on the estimated population for some fixed year in the future. As
Singer points out, this method gives incentive to keep a nation’s population down; the
smaller the population is at the target year, the greater the allocation is per capita. This
type of distribution embodies the idea that each individual has an equal share to the
global commons, regardless of what nation he is from, and protects nations from having
to pay for offenses that they did not know that they were committing. Further, it allows
developing nations the much needed room to grow; that is, their claim on the atmosphere
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will not be diminished because they are not yet industrialized, rather they will be given
the leeway to move towards industrialization.
Moreover, such a procedure would have to respect the fundamental interests of
all the peoples of the Society of Peoples as specified behind the veil of ignorance; in
general, these interests include the protection of a peoples’ political independence as well
as the protection of its security, territory, and well-being of its citizens, and the
preservation of its self-respect and self-determination. Thus, no procedure could be
adopted that unfairly favored the interests of one people over another. Further, as all
members of the Society of Peoples are equals, all should be treated as such; Rawls writes,
“Well-ordered peoples insist on equality among themselves as peoples…”149 In general
then, no such procedure should be adopted that forced one people to suffer undue
hardships for the benefit of another people. Any mechanism adopted should also contain
an element of mutuality. That is, the chosen procedure should be one that, “… a people
sincerely believes other equal peoples might accept also; and should they do so, a people
will honor the terms it has proposed even in those cases where a people might profit from
violating them.”150 Contained in this idea of mutuality is the ability of all peoples to
agree on the procedure without having to submit to a position of inferiority. The reasons
appealed to in support of such principles should be properly political; that is, for example,
a certain religious doctrine, on its own, does not offer good reasons for others to accept or
reject any given mechanism.
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The final criterion that any mechanism must meet is that of economic
efficiency, which is concerned with maximizing the social benefit of instituting the
principle, constrained by the criteria that trade should be both free and fair. Since
externalities pose the risk of inefficiency, any mechanism that was instituted to deal with
the problem of externalities should be concerned with efficiency. Again, here the
importance of a fair distribution of initial rights is highlighted. It is imperative that, from
the start, rights are assigned that establish either the right to pollute or the right to be free
from pollution. These rights will establish the initial bargaining positions; from these
positions individuals/peoples can deal with each other depending upon how much they
value the right to pollute and the right to be free of pollution. One such way to ensure
this type of efficiency is to use the global market. In this setting, participants can bargain
to the most efficient outcome. Simply put, within the market setting, participants can sell
or purchase their rights as they see fit; the outcome will be the most efficient outcome
(that which maximizes social utility). Employing the use of the global market also helps
to ensure that any people that is subjected to another people’s externalities will do so
voluntarily (fairly). That is, the offending people will have to purchase another people’s
right to be free from harmful externalities.151
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This line of argumentation is based primarily on the Coase Theorem. The Coase Theorem states:
“In a well-functioning market, individuals trade with one another in ways that benefit all concerned. These
exchanges are Pareto superior or Pareto improving (barring adverse third-party effects). In a perfect or
idealized market, such exchanges occur until no further mutually advantageous exchanges can be made.
(Jules L Coleman, Jules L., “Law, economic approach to,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ed. E.
Craig (London: Routledge 1998). <http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/T015SECT2> (23 May 2005).)”
Essential to this theory is the assignment of property rights, as they define the initial bargaining positions; if
property rights are uncertain, then successful exchange becomes jeopardized. So, in the case of climate
change it is important to assign rights to the atmospheric commons. Additionally, there must be a market
in which the transactions may occur. This means that there needs to be some sort of global emissions
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As a matter of summary, then, any mechanism that is established to realize the
ninth principle should meet a certain set of criteria. First, the procedure should be fair.
Thus, it needs to be decided what a fair allocation of the global atmosphere would be.
Additionally, the procedure should protect the fundamental interests of the members of
the Society of Peoples and should recognize each member as an equal. Consequently, the
mechanism should fairly consider the interests of all peoples and no people should be
forced to adopt undue hardships for the benefit of another. Next, the procedure should
embody an element of mutuality; that is, is should be a procedure that can be accepted by
other equal peoples. Finally, the mechanism should be concerned with efficiency.
Therefore, it should seek to maximize the social benefit within the limits of free and fair
trade.

Section IV - Free Riding and Climate Change
Working from Rawls’s account of ideal theory, a direct application of the eight
principles (and the proposed ninth) leads towards collective action and treaty-making as
countries that did not want or need them. According to Coase, these transactions would continue until the
most efficient allocation was reached – such an allocation would distribute emissions quotas to the societies
that needed them until the costs of quotas become such that they outweighed the benefits of emitting, while
at the same time distributing the monetary value of the quotas to the less emitting countries until these
benefits were outweighed by the costs of giving up their right to emit/their right to be free from pollution.
Coase argues that in perfect market situations, the social costs of one’s actions – “the external effects;
effects of one person’s conduct or consumption on the welfare of others” – will be internalized. (Jules
Coleman and Jeffrie Murphy, eds. Philosophy of Law (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 187.)
So, for the case at hand, the damage done by harmful green house gas emissions will be
internalized by putting a price on the right to emit, the sum of which will be paid to the country that would
have otherwise suffered from the damaging externalities. (Of course, there are some shortcomings to this
theory. First, this theory assumes that there will be zero transaction costs. Additionally, market correction
of inefficiencies is dependant upon the transaction being allowed. So, in order to correct for the externality
of GHG, there must be rules that allow for such transactions. Also, there could be problems in agreeing to a
fair initial distribution of property rights. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, hold-out behavior can
decrease the possibility of ending up at the most efficient allocation. That is, this theory is dependant upon
individuals acting cooperatively. (Andrew Altman. Arguing About Law, 2nd ed. (Belmont: Wadsworth
Publishing, 2001), 181-183.)
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ways to deal with the problem of climate change (as a coordinated extension of the duty
of assistance). Unfortunately, this leaves the door open for the opportunity to free ride. In
other words, peoples that do not participate in collective action or treaty making, and thus
don’t bear the costs of such actions, can still reap the benefits. His account of ideal theory
states that as members of the Society of Peoples, peoples ought to live up to their duty of
assistance. Thus, any collective action that is taken as an extension of this duty should be
honored by all members of the Society of Peoples. With regards to climate change, it is
presumably the case that any free rider (especially one as large and damaging as the
United States) could compromise the effectiveness of collective action, if that people is
not undertaking a unilateral plan to fulfill their duty of assistance. In such cases,
economic and diplomatic sanctions may be justified. Measures such as these may in fact
motivate a people into compliance. But, what if they don’t work? Unfortunately,
Rawls’s theory does not offer any direction to dealing with the problem of free riders
beyond this point. However, it may be the case that there is a solution to the problem of
free riders in the instance of climate change and situations like it. Specifically, based on
the predictions that climate change will threaten the ability of some peoples to remain
well-ordered, coupled with the fact that a people has a right to war in self-defense, as a
very last resort, coercion (possibly in the form of military intervention) may be justified
on those peoples that are not cooperating, that are significant contributors to the problem,
and, at the same time, are not taking any unilateral efforts to fulfill their duty of
assistance.152
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To begin, it is worth noting that it may be the case that a people has reasonable
objections to the proposed actions of the Society of Peoples. Such objections are
extensions of a people’s reasonable interests. Rawls defines the reasonable interests of a
liberal people in the following manner:
They seek to protect their territory, to ensure the security and safety of
their citizens, and to preserve their free political institutions and the
liberties and free culture of their civil society. Beyond these interests, a
liberal people tries to assure reasonable justice for all its citizens and for
all peoples…153
Thus, in any treaty making or collective action situation, it may be that a people may
have reasonable objections to the proposed treaty or collective action. However, there
are limits that are placed on these interests. Rawls states clearly that “…no people has
the right to self-determination, or a right to secession at the expense of subjugating
another people.”154 As an example of such a violation, Rawls cites the South’s attempt
to secede in the late 1860s. He claims that such action was unjustified since it was doing
so to perpetuate the institution of slavery, an institution that was based on severe human

of free riders, defined by one party enjoying the benefits of collective action, but refusing to participate in
collective action. The second issue is related to, but can be distinguished from free riding. Namely, it may
be the case that a would-be free rider refusing to participate in collective action can completely negate the
actions of the other parties. That is, the benefit of collective action can never be realized because of the
actions of the would-be free rider. (In this instance, it would be incorrect to deem the nonparticipating
party a free rider because there would be no benefits on which to free ride.) It is arguably the case that both
situations should be treated in the same manner. Specifically, both free-riders and would be free-riders, in
the instances where the duty to assist is triggered to protect the well-orderedness of a people, should be
(first) subject to economic and diplomatic sanctions and/or (second) military intervention if they refuse to
act on this obligation. However, as noted above, refusing to participate in collective action does not, in and
of itself, justify sanctions or military intervention. The people has a duty of assistance whether or not it
participates in collective action. Thus, sanctions and military intervention can only be justified when a
peoples has first refused to participate in collective action and has also failed to undertake any unilateral
action to sufficiently fulfill its duty, and when the total benefits of such action would outweigh the costs.
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rights violations.155 While not as overt or direct as slavery, the effects of climate change
will violate human rights standards and threaten the well-orderedness of many peoples.
Thus, the largest and most damaging emitters cannot appeal to their right to a free culture
or self-determination since such rights (in this case) are dependant upon the subjugation
of other peoples.
It still may be the case that a people can have a reasonable objection to the action
or treaty proposed by the Society of Peoples. However, it does not seem that such an
objection could free a people from its duty of assistance, although it may free a people
from a particular treaty or proposed action; the Law of Peoples is binding on all members
of the Society of Peoples. If a people has legitimate, reasonable objections to such
actions, it has a duty to engage in unilateral actions that will adequately satisfy their duty
of assistance. Failure to meet this obligation would effectively render a nation an outlaw
state.
Outlaw states are those regimes that refuse to comply with a reasonable Law of
Peoples.156 However, Rawls limits his discussion of such states to those societies that
wage war on other societies to advance their own rational interests. Rawls writes that
well-ordered peoples have a right to war only as a matter of self-defense. He explains
“To trespass on citizens’ liberty by conscription, or other such practices in raising armed
forces, may only be done on a liberal political conception for the sake of liberty itself,
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that is, as necessary to defend liberal democratic institutions and civil society’s many
religious and nonreligious traditions and forms of life.”157
At this point, I extend Rawls’s idea, arguing that self defense may require going
to war with countries that are well-ordered, but fail to comply with the list of principles
that constitute the Law of Peoples. Such an action may in fact be “…for the sake of
liberty itself, that is, as necessary to defend liberal democratic institutions and civil
society’s many religious and nonreligious traditions and forms of life.”158 Further, this
action is only justified when a people’s territory, basic structure, and organizations
supporting human rights are endangered (in short, when its well-orderedness is
threatened). If a people fails to act on its duty to assist, and their actions threaten the
well-orderedness of other peoples, then strict forms of coercion can be justified only with
the failure of economic and political sanctions, and only when the total benefits of
intervention would exceed the total costs.
I hold that strict forms of coercion may be the only answer, but such an action is
to be used only as a last resort, when the total benefits of the action will outweigh the
total costs, and only when the consequences of the offending society threaten the wellorderedness of other peoples or make it impossible for other peoples to maintain
territorial integrity in perpetuity. In the case of climate change, peoples that are
significant emitters of greenhouse gases that refuse to participate in collective action
while at the same time refusing to embark on unilateral efforts to fulfill their duty of
assistance are effectively attacking those peoples that will most severely suffer the
157
158
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consequences of climate change. Thus, as a matter of self-defense, military action can be
taken against the offender. Such action would be necessary only until the offending
country was forced into compliance or agreed to comply.
The objection may be raised that allowing for such actions would violate Rawls’s
conception of tolerance. Included in this idea is the requirement of a liberal society to
respect the diverse comprehensive doctrines of its citizens (within limits) and,
internationally, that a liberal society tolerate nonliberal societies that meet certain
standards of political right and justice, while leading its people to a respect and adhere to
a reasonable Law of Peoples. However, it may be the case that while a society is liberal
internally – it is well-ordered and respects the comprehensive doctrines of its citizens – it
may not be adhere to the Law of Peoples. That is, there could be a democratic country
that acts on its rational interests rather than on reasonable terms. Should such a nation be
tolerated when its actions threaten the well-orderedness of other societies? If military
action is allowed when an outlaw state has violated the human rights of is own citizens or
as “… necessary to defend liberal democratic institutions and civil society’s many
religious and nonreligious traditions and forms of life,” then it should be allowed when a
state is violating the human rights of other nation’s citizens or when a state is
jeopardizing the well-orderedness of other societies.159
While the infringement on well-orderedness resulting from climate change is less
than overt and will likely take years to come into full effect, the strictest forms of
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coercion may seem severe and unreasonable. However, the nature of climate change is
that emissions today will cause damage many years from now.

Rawls writes,

As I see the point of the institution of property is that, unless a definitive
agent is given responsibility for maintaining an asset and bears the loss for
not doing so, that asset tends to deteriorate. In this case, the asset is the
people’s territory and its capacity to support them in perpetuity; and the
agent themselves as politically organized. As I noted in the Introduction,
they are to recognize that they cannot make up for their irresponsibility in
caring for their land and its natural resources by conquest of war or by
migrating into other people’s territory without their consent.160
The environmental damage that will likely be caused by climate change will, in many
instances, limit the ability of some well-ordered peoples to support themselves in
perpetuity, and in this way may also threaten well-orderedness. It is the government’s
responsibility to make sure that its people’s land is cared for and that its natural resources
are managed wisely. If a government is careless with these responsibilities, then war
with, or expansion into, other countries cannot be justified. However, it may not be the
case that territorial degradation is the fault of the government; territorial degradation may
occur because of uncontrollable and unpredictable natural disasters, or, as is the case with
climate change, it may occur because of the actions of other peoples (in this case, the
irresponsible use of fossil fuels). In the latter case, it seems that if the offending people is
not willing to change its ways, to engage in collective action to rectify the problem, or to
live up to its duty to assist, and it can be shown that its actions are either (or both)
threatening the well-orderedness of a people, or infringing on the ability of a people to
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maintain its territorial integrity in perpetuity, then strict forms of coercion may be
justified.161
In sum, while Rawls does not directly deal with the problem of free riders beyond
the point of political and economic sanctions, his theory can be extended to ground strict
forms of coercion (possibly military intervention) against offending peoples on the basis
of self-defense. Specifically, climate change will threaten the ability of peoples to remain
well-ordered. Peoples that are emitting damaging amounts of greenhouse gases, while
simultaneously refusing to act on their duty to assist, are, in a way, attacking the peoples
that will suffer the worst consequences of climate change. On this basis, military actions
can be taken against offending countries as a form of self-defense, but only as a last
resort.

Conclusion
In this section, I explored the applicability of Rawls’s The Law of Peoples to the
problem of climate change. It has been shown that climate change has the potential to
affect the well-orderedness of just and decent regimes. Thus, the duty to assist can be
extended to protect those peoples that are the subjects of such threats. Additionally, I
have shown that behind the veil of ignorance, parties in the original position would agree
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combat climate change while simultaneously not undertaking any program to live up to their duty of
assistance.). Thus, not all free riders can properly be the subjects of coercion or military intervention.
Additionally, coercion or military intervention for the case of climate change may need to be taken
proactively if a people is threatening the well-orderedness of another by refusing to adopt any measures
towards abatement. Or, it may also be justified after the damage has been done, and a people is not willing
to act on its duty to assist to help repair the damage that it has contributed to.
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to a ninth principle. Specifically, representatives would agree to a principle that would
fairly address the problem of externalities. Finally, I showed that Rawls’s theory is also
equipped to deal with the problem of free riders in the case of climate change. Namely,
as a matter of self-defense, coercion (possibly in the form of military intervention) can be
taken against an offending peoples who refuse to act on their duty of assistance and
whose actions threaten the well-orderedness of other peoples. In conclusion, Rawls’s
theory as espoused in The Law of Peoples is able to adequately deal with the problem of
climate change.
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Conclusion
While there is much hype surrounding the problem of climate change on the
international front, this problem has yet to receive the attention that it rightly deserves. In
general, many policymakers cite the uncertainties surrounding climate change predictions
as reasons not yet to act; additionally, some leaders are unwilling to commit to carrying
their nation’s fair share of the burden. In this paper, I have attempted to reframe the
problem of climate change. In sum, I have argued that it is rational for policymakers to
act on the model-generated predictions surrounding climate change and that the
framework that Rawls details in The Law of Peoples is a viable option for dealing with
this problem. In conclusion, not only is it rational to act on the model-generated
predictions of climate change, but (working within Rawls’s framework) failure to
adequately do so would be a failure to act on one’s duty to assist.
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